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Inmate Name David Dalrymple 
IDOC No. 74871 
Address Kit Carson Correctional center 
PO. Box 2000 
Burlington, Co. 80807 
Pg. 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 9th JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




State Of Idaho 
respondent 
Case No. H0301506 & H0301629 
SUCCESSIVE PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT 
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF. 
Pg.2 
STATEMENT OF FACT. 
Throughout all of the legal proceedings that have taken place 
in this matter-including trial, appeal from convictions that 
resulted at trial, the subsequent post-conviction proceedings, the 
appeal from those post-conviction findings, and now this successive 
post-conviction- Mr.Dalrymple has steadfastly alledged that he is 
not guilty of the sexual molestation charges because he had only 
hypnotized Kelsea Breton to believe that she has been molested,but 
in fact she had never been actually physically molested by him. 
Dalrymple alledged that he performed this hypnosis upon Kelsea 
in order to keep her safe. On professional and ethical grounds 
Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel disagreed with Mr.Dalrymple concerning 
the presentation of a defense, and the presentation of any defense 
evidence in respect to the possible hypnosis of Kelsea Breton. 
(see Trial Tr. pg.349,thru 353) and (P.C.Tr.pg.1]7,L.10 to pg.117) 
At the close of the May 2004 trial Dalrymple protested to the court 
that his trial councel had not presented his hypnosis defense. 
(Trial Tr.pg.395,thru406.) 
The trial court listened to the rationale for not presenting 
the hypnosis defense thathad beenproffered by Mr.Dalrymple. The 
court then allowed defense councel to further undermine Dalrymple's 
defense by claiming a "conflict" preverited.him from presenting 
or investigating Dalrymple's defense. The court then gave Dalrymple 
the ultimatum to either discharge his attorney in order and proceed 
pro-se if he wished to present evidense, or, keep D'Angelo as his 
counsel and concede that the case was now closed.(Trial Tr.pg.407, 
408) 
Dalrymple was unsuccesfull at his Post Conviction hearing 
largely due to his now paid attorney's inability to find an expert 
in hypnosis, and his negligence with the issues. 
Dalrymple askes that the Court Overturn his Convictions in full, 
Vacate his Senteces, and, Remand. 
Thank You, Respectfully, 
Pg.3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
An applicant for post conviction relief has the burden of 
proving, by preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which 
the claim is based. Idaho Criminal Rule 57(c);Estes v.State,111 
Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135,141(1986);Clark v. State,92 Idaho 827, 
830, 452 P.2d 54,57(1969). 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be properly 
brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v.State, 
121 Idaho 918,924-25, 828 P.2d 1323,1329-30(Ct.App.1992) 
A successive petition for ineffective assistance of counsel 
may also be brought under the post-conviction act, as post conviction 
is the petition designed to address ineffective counsel issues. 
Martinez v. Ryan,u.s. Court Of Appeals (9th Cir. 2012) Without 
adequete representation in an initial-review collateral proceeding 
a prisoner will have similar difficulties vindicating ineffective 
assistance at trial claim. The same would be true if the state did 
not appoint an attorney for the initial-review collateral proceeding 
A prisoner's inability to present an ineffective-assistance claim 
is of a particular concern because the right to effective trial 
counsel is a bedrock principal in this nation's justice system. 
To prvail_on an.ineffective assistance of counsel claim,the 
defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient 
and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiancy. Strckland 
v, Washington,466 U.S.668,687-88(1984);Hassett v.State,127 Idaho 
313,316,900 P.2d 221,224(Ct.App.1995) To establish a deficiency, 
the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Aragon v.State,114 Idaho 758,760,760 P.2d 1174,1176(1998) To establish 
prejudice,the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, 
but for the attorney's defitiant performance, the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.Id.at 761,760 P.2d at 1177. Tactical 
or strategic decisions of counsel will not be second guessed unless 
those decisions are based on inadeguete preperation, ignorance of 
z..:..::::: 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Howard v. State,126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,263(Ct.App.1994) 
THE UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION ACT is" the exclusive means for 
challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence" other than 
by direct appeal.Rhoades v. State,148 Idaho 215,217,220 P3d 571,573 
(2009) 
Pg.4 
ISSUES PRESENTED. #1 
Dalrymple was denied effective assistance of counsel as a 
result of his trial counsel's failure to request a pre-trial 
proceeding to determine both the existence, and the potential 
prejudicial effect of, confabulated witness testimony arising from 
hypnotic suggestion. 
ISSUE #2 
Dalrymple was deprived of his right to confront and cross 
examine his accusers. 
ISSUE #3 
Involuntary and Untimley Waiver to Proceed Pro-Se. 
ISSUE.#4 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Due To 
Conflict of Interest. 
ISSUE #5 
Constructive Denial of Counsel. 
ISSUE #6 
Incompetent to Stand Trial. 
ISSUE #7 
Counsel's Cumulative Errors. 
ISSUE #8 
ABUSE OF Disccretion 
ISSUE #9 
INEFFECTIVE Assistance by Counsel on Collateral Proceeding. 
ISSUE #10 
Dalrymple was deprived of his 5th Amendment Right of Due Process 
His 6th Amendment Right of Confrontation, and, Compulsory-
Process, and, Counsel for his Defense. 
HiS~Bt~iAmendment Right that Excessive Bail shall not be Required, 
Nor Excessive Fines Imposed, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Inflicted. and, Dalrymple has been DEprived of his 14th 
Amendment Rights thru DEprovation of Liberty Without Due Process, 
and the constructive Denial of Equal Protection of the Law. 
ISSUE 
Dalrymple was Denied Effective Assistance of Council at trial 
as a result of his trial councel's failure to investigate, and 
failure to request the pre-trial procedure for the determination 
of the existence of,and potentially prejudicial effect of, witness 
testimony arising from hypnotic suggestoin. 
Dalrymple has consistently maintained that he never commited 
any of the physical acts upon Kelsea that were the basis for his 
conviction of the sexual molestation charges. He has consistently 
maintained that Kelsea's testimony at trial was the result of 
false memories of sexual molestation that Dalrymple had placed in 
Kelsea's mind as the result of hypnosis. 
Dalrymple clearly wanted to present hypnosis, and evidence of 
hypnosis as the foundation of his defense. Mr.DeAngelo's failure 
to investigate left Dalrymple unprepaired. Mr.DeAngelo addmitts at 
the questioning of the court that he doesn't understand how to 
e~tablish foundation,There is no education,and it makes no sense 
to him, and to him that is tantemount to asking the jury to come 
back with a guilty verdict. DeAngelo goes on to claim"we have no 
scientific background that we could establish this" See Trial TR. 
Pg.349,350) 
On the same pages DrAngelo makes it clear he never spoke 
with Shelley or Kelsea. Never asked the court to be allowed an 
intrview, and at the April 7th hearing told the court speaking 
with Shelley or Kelsea wasn't necessary.See pre trial April7th) 
At trial both the prosecuting attorney and Dalrymple's 
trial counsel relied upon the same Idaho precident-Statev.Iwakiri, 
106 Idaho 618,682 P.2d571(1984)-as providing the legal basis 
under Idaho law for determining whether testimonyby a witness should 
be admissibleafter having undergone hypnosis which could have 
potentially altered memory,or even implanted false mrmories, in 
respect to proposed testimony that is to be presented at trial by 
that witness. Since Mr.DeAngelo knows of and has read Iwakiri well 
enough to rely on the precedents ther, he would also have known 
about The Idaho Supreme Court adopting a pre-trial procedure by 
which such potentially tainted testimony could be challenged and 
tested. Mr.DeAngelo's claim of "no scientific background" must 
have been an error. Or a lie. 
Pg.6 
Even if such testimony were determined to be admissiblr, it 
could still be challenged and limited to both weight and credibility 
as a result of the hynosis. 
Under the Iwakiri decision the question as to whether proposed 
testimony to be presented by a witness at trial has been tainted 
by hypnosis is a question for the trial court to determine at a 
pre-trial hearing. the district court at the post conviction hearing 
in this case indicated that this would be the procedure that should 
be followed if its decision denying post-conviction relief is 
reversed avd the case remanded: 
(Tr. pg.29,L. 23 to pg.30 L.6) 
If a new trial is ordered in this case,I'm not sure that 
necessarily,Ihave to go there in terms of we do have the earlier 
precidence cited by both of you from the Supreme Court regarding 
testimony that is elicited through hypnotism, but I think that that's 
another step in the event that the court were to grant a new trial, 
we would probably have a pre-trial hearing in that regard. 
:n the course,d7$1//,~~findings of fact at the close of the post-conviction 
hearingJudge McGloughlin declared that those facts concerning this 
issue of potentially hypnotically-tainted testimony were entirely 
absent from this case.(Tr.pg •• 206,L.5 to pg.207,L.8) 
There is no evidence before this court from a hypnotist that 
this testimony and the incredible suggestion made to a child that 
she has been sexually abused, when in fact, she has not been sexually 
abused, and for this theory or defense imposed by Mr.Dalrymple, 
there's no showing that such a suggestion, hypnotic suggestion is 
even possible. Perhaps, it is possible, butI'd have to speculate. 
THe burden is upon the petitioner to show that, A, this 
hypnosis ocured, perhaps, through having a hypnotist interview the 
victim or review their testimony. I would simply have to speculate 
as to whether or not an expert in hypnosis couldhave come in and 
said, well,this is all, not only possible, but it's highly probable. 
I just have nothing. 
And again, I I know that both Mr. DaNgelo and frankly, 
Mr.Schwartz, you've tried today to do your best to find somebody 
that could come in and kind of focus on these issues and structure 
them in a way where the court could look at this and say,okay, 
well an expert has said he has an opinion that perhaps this childs 
Pg.7 
te§timony had the kind of syntax and rythm to it that indicates 
that she may haue been hypnotized; that this kind of hypnotic 
__ suggestion is possible, and could, in fact, have taken place. It's 
all speculation. 
Although Judge McGloughlin, based upon professional and ethical 
concerns had excused Mr. Dalrymple's trial counsel from any obligation 
to elicit any testimony concerning the potential effects of 
hypnotically-alterd testimony in this case. The district court also 
noted that this was one area where the performance of Mr.Dalrymple's 
trial council had in fact been deficiant:(Tr.pg. 212, L. 17 to pg. 
213, L.6) 
based upon those findings :.the~~cc;:nirt~then would conclude that 
the totality of the evidence here, that there was no ineffective 
.assistance of counsel with that one somewhat minor exception, and 
that was whether or not Mr. DeAngelo'had fully and completely 
attempted to find an expert on hypnosis. 
And when you look at the standard in Strickland,again I 
don't want to send the higher court a conflicing ruling on this, 
but I think it.:::_ma~_-_be.::that theee could have been possibly a little 
more effort in that area. I frankly,cannot find from the totality 
of the evidence that that one· issue rose to the level of ineffective 
,assistance of counsel. 
A substantial portion of the Iwakiri decision is composed 
of Justice Bistline's dissenting opinion. 106 Idaho at 627-654, 
682 P.2d at 580-607. although not authoritative in respect to new 
principles of law, or as the rule of decision announced in that 
case, Justice Bistline's citation to additional facts based upon 
the record on appeal in that case that were not referanced in the 
majorityopinion, and his citation to other persuasive authorities 
does provide reliable background information that is relavant to 
the determination of the issues raised on this case. 
In fact Justice Bistline sets out in his dissenting opinion 
a number of extensive quotations from the transcript in that case 
that are quite informative as to similar issues that are presented 
to this court. For example,one of the defense experts who testified 
in the Iwakiri case, Dr.Bishop Basil Rhodes, discussed the use of 
"identical phraseology" or "mirrored phrases" as an indicator of 
hypnotically-influenced testimony, which may be the source of the 
district court'sdecloration in this case concerning the absence of 
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any evidence in the record that indicaied that,"this child's 
testimony had the kind of syntax of rythm to it that indicates that 
she may have been hypnotized •• " Tr.pg.207 LL.3-5) Of course,the 
absence of that evidence is the direct result of the failure of 
Mr. dalrymple's trial council to even make an attempt to elicet 
that testimonythrough the pre-trial procedure that was outlined by 
the majority in the Iwakiri ~decision. 
Two very telling issues that were present in this case-the 
apparent absence of qualified experts, and the question of 
Mr.Oalrymple's qualification as a hypnotist-were also present in 
the Iwakiri case. 
Mr. Dalrymple's trial council(Mr.DeAngelo) testified at the 
post-conviction hearing as to 'his inability in 2004 to obtain any 
expert witnesses in hypnosis.(see P.C. Tr.pg.119 L.5 to 18) 
Yat almost a quarter of a century earlier,in the early 1980's 
the defense in the Iwakiri case,which also was heard and determined 
in Boise, was able to procure two expert witnesses: Richard Hannebaum 
and Dr. Bishop Basil Rhodes.106 Idaho at 641,682 P.2d at 594. The 
testimony of these two defense experts as to potential hazards posed 
by hypnoticaly-influenced testimony is extensively set out or 
summarized in Justice Bistline'sdissent.106 Idaho at 627,-654,682 
P.2d at 580-607) The citation to this expert testimony on the effects 
of hypnotism on the reliability of trial testimony was bolstered 
by citations to other legal authorities, including questions concerning 
the existence of implanted false memories.(106 Idaho at 648-649 
P.2d at 106-02) 
It is significant to the second issue, as to Mr.Dalrympl~'o 
own qualifications as a hypnotist, that in the Iwakiri case the 
initial hypnosis session also had been conducted by a seemingly 
unqualified individual, a Boise Police Department detective,whose 
testimony was objected to at trial "on the grounds that Detective 
Anderson was not qualified to conduct the hypnosis session,but 
the court allowed his testimony.Rpt.Tr.V.6,p.662-66~ (106 Idaho at 
637,682 P.2d at 590. Detective Anderson was cross examined about 
his qualifications to conduct the hypnosis session.Rpt Tr.V.6,p.873 
et seq~ ID. 
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The majority opinion in Iwakiri rejected any of the 'per se• 
rules formulated by other courts concerning the admissibility of 
hypnoticaly-affected testimony and instead adopted a rule for 
determining competency based upon an evaluation using six enumerated 
safeguards. 106 IDaho at 625,682 P.2d.at 578. The majority further 
noted that," It would be an unusual case if all of the mentioned 
safeguards were followed~ 106 Idaho at 626, 682 P.2d at 579. 
These six safeguards were specifically formulated to address 
the question of hypnoticaly-enhanced testimony for the puposes of 
prospectively refreshing the recollection of facts by a witness, 
which was the question that was presented in the Iwakiri case. 
Although a different situation was presented in this case,involving 
the question of whether false memories had been previously 
hypnoticaly implanted in a witness, both the prsecution and the 
defense in this case relied upon the safeguards announced in the 
Iwakiri case as establishing the necessary foundational elements 
for the addmission of the hypnosis theory that was advanced by 
Mr.Dalrymple as the foundation of his defense in the case. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Iwakiri safeguards were 
designed to be implemented in respect to the prospective use of 
hypnosis,the implimentayion of those safeguards, or similar safeguards 
in respect to a witness who is alleged to have been previously 
subjected to hypnosis, through a pre-trial procedure was the 
significant omission by Mr. Dalrymple's trial counsel that 
constitutes the ineffective assistance of counsel that prejudiced 
Mr.Dalrymple's case.If in fact his conviction was based upon 
testimony concerning acts that never occurred, but instead 
was the result of testimony based upon false mamories that 
had been hypnoticaly implanted. 
THe use of the Iwakiri pre-trial procedure avoids two 
problems that prominently prejudiced Mr. Dalrymple's defense in 
this case. First, and perhaps most significantly,use of the 
pre-trial procedure places the decision concerning the determination 
of the competency of witness testimony that is to be presented at 
trial in the hands of the court. ~,use of the pre trial 
procedure avoids the professional and ethical concerns that arose 
during this trial in respect to the presentation of previously 
unvetted testimony to a jury,which led the district court to determine 
that it had to excuss Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel and coerce 
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Mr. Dalrymple into proceeding pro-se in order to present his chosen 
defense concerning hypnoticaly influenced testimony to the jury. 
Mr.Dalrymple, by his own addmission,only completed his formal 
education through the Ninth grade.His knowledge of hypnosis was 
largely self taught. And his stated purpose in hypnotically implanting 
the false memories in Kelsea appeared to be irrational and self-
destructive.See Trial TR. Idaho v. Dalrymple) 
Yet the question that is presented on this appeal ,is not 
whether his proposed defense was"stupid" as it was characterized 
by his trial counsel, Nor whether in the estimation of Mr.DAngelo 
his trial counsel, there was no way that he could establish the 
requesit foundation necessary to establish Mr.Dalrymple's chosen 
defense. 
Instead, the question presented here is whether Mr.Dalrymple-
or any defendant for that matter-shoul.Dbe accorded thier fifth, 
and fotteenth amendment rights to due process, Shoul they have 
access to a full and fair determination of whether the trial testimony 
that is presented against them1 and upon which he could be convicted 
and sentenced to life in prison,has been previously hypnotically 
tainted from any source? Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel failed to 
request the pre-trial procedure for making this determination that 
was outlined in Iwakiri. His failure to do so constituted 
ineffective assistanse of counsel and prejudiced Mr.Dalrymple'.s 
by allowing for his conviction based upon acts that he did oat 
commit if the witnesses' testimony that led to his conviction was 
based upon hypnotcally implanted false memories. 
The 1V84 Iwakiri decision was issued contemporaneously with 
the eruption of the McMartin Pre-School scandl in California. 
McMartin,and related cases,demonstated how highly susceptible 
young children are to suggestion,regardless of whether those 
suggestions are made hypnoticaly or by other means through which 
a favored answer is indicated. One of the lessons imparted from 
that experience is the importence of judicial process in providing 
necessary protections against implanted or false testimony both 
as protection to those who have genuinely suffered from molestation 
and as a protection to those who are falsely accused. The ultimate 
question here is not whether Mr.Dalrymple's Proffered hypnotic 
defense was actually credible or even self-defeating, But whether 
he was afforded a full and fair opotunity to present that defense 
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in respect to testimony that was aledged to be hypnotially 
implanted or tainted. Based upon the record before this court he 
was not,and therefore this conviction should be reversed. 
Mr.Dalrymple's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
of counsel that created the possibility that Mr.Dalrymple was 
convicted for acts he didn't commit as a result of his trial counsel's 
failure to investigate,and failure to request the pre-trial 
procedure for determining if potential trial testimony had been 
hypnoticaly tainted and ,AS a consequence Mr.Dalrymple's 
conviction should be reversed. 
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ISSUE 
Mr.Dalrymple was deprived of his right to defend against his 
accusers, Present evidence in his favor,Or present a complete 
defense. 
Mr. Dalrymple was deprived of his right to confront and cross 
examine his accusers when the District Court refused to allow him 
to recallKelsea after his council was discharged and he was representing 
himself. See trial tran. Pg. 388,389,390,391, 
JUdge McGloughlin: You may call your next witness• 
Dalrymple;"Kelsea Breton" 
Ms.Fisher; Kelsea has been released from her subpoena and is ~t 
school. She was released yesterday. 
McGloughlin; I'm going to sustain. she was released. 
After a brief back and forth with the court Dalrymple state he has 
other evidence that is not in the courtroom(due to D'Angelo's refusal 
to investigate) The court sends the jury out then asks Dalrymple 
"did you have any additional evidence you wished to present? 
I'll let you make an offer of proof,if youlld like, asto what you 
believe Kelsea would testify to •• not what she would testify to 
what you intend to prove through her,if you would like. 
Dalrymple is unsure he attempts to ask the court a question, 
eventually Dalrymple says:what I would hope to prove is that we did 
the hypnosis._ 
McGloughlin; anything eles: Dalrymple attempts to answer once again 
the court cuts him off and advisess him to "Stick to my question" 
11 What eles would you prove by calling Kelsea to the stand? 
Dalrymple( By simply calling her to the stand,the only thing that 
I could prove is that we actually did the hypnosis; that we actually 
did the countdown and that she and I were there and that it did 
happen. 
McGloughlin/4 All right.And did you have any other evidence ••• 
Dalrymple(from Ln. 4 Pg.391) The other evidence is there was a 
journal in the garage at the house.There was three tapes, three 
cassette tapes in the --tapes in the house, and in the computer 
at the house is an on line library that we pay a subscription for. 
And in the first two chips of every computer built in 93, it records 
~very place it went and everything it saw.And whats on that computer 
is from that library is all about the hypnosis.It's just verification 
that that's what I was studying. 
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Mcgloughlin; Anything eles? Besides Kelsea and the computer/ 
Dalrymple; Shelley needs to understand ••• 
Mcgloughlin; Well I'm not here to councel.I just want to know what 
other evidence you would bring in? Kelsea,the computer,journals, 
and you said tapes. Anything else? 
Dalrymple: Idon't know of anything else. 
McGloughlin: Okay. Well you've testified as to the computer, the 
journals. 
Dalrymple: Unless somebody would go get an expert in hypnosis and 
we can talk about how this was done and if it was even possible. 
McGloughlin: I'm going to find that the evidence has been produced 
at this trial.THis case is coming to a close. You've talked about 
the computer. You've talked about the journals. You've talked about 
the tapes.Kelsea was released as a witness. there was no objection. 
And so, this case is going to be brought to a close unless the state 
has rebuttal evidence. 
Ms. Fisher; No sir. 
McGloughlin; Bring in the jury. We're going to closing arguments 
after final instructions. Bring in the jury. 
This testimony about additional evidence,happens without the 
jury present. Not only is Dalrymple deprived of his right to question 
Kelsea about hypnosis. He is also deprived of his right to present 
evidence that would further exonerate him. Then his testimony 
about Kelsea's knowledge, and the existance of physical evidence 
is never heard by the jury. 
The Compulsory Process Clause of the 6th amendment, grants a 
defendant the right to offer theietstimony of favorable witnesses 
and to compel their attendance at trial. To exercise the compulsory 
process right,a defendant must show that the testimony would be 
material and favorable to the defendant, and not merly cumulative. 
(Done and Done) 
Dalrymple's testimony is that Kelsea will be a witness that can 
verify his statements about hypnosis, Dalrymple's testimony about 
his journal, cassete tapes, and the computer, was physical evidence 
that would prove his account and exonerate him of the molestation 
charges. 
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,However the right is not absolute and may yield to other 
interests. 
Dalrymple questions what other interests(if any) were presented in 
order to prevent the presentation of his journal, the cassete tapes, 
the computer,and, Kelsea's testimony. 
Dalrymple questions; If such other interests do exist, why was 
there not a hearing to determine the validity of those interests? 
A violation of the Compulsory Process Clause is also subject 
to harmless error analysis and will contitute harmless error if it 
is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not 
contribute to the verdict. 
The testimony and evidence Dalrymple was denied would have 
quite possibly changed the verdict to not guilty. Therefore had it 
not been for the violation of Compulsory Process by Judge McGloughlin 
the verdict would have been different. The absence of Exculpatory 
evidence that was readily available is testiment to both D'Angelo's 
unwillingness,or inability to assist his client, and McGloughlin's 
indiferance to a defendants right. 
In enacting prcedural rules, a state may not arbitrarily limit 
a defendants ability to secure the testimony of witnesses favorable 
to them, or arbitrarily limit the evidence a defendant may present. 
Dalrymple does not recieve any reason why he is not allowed 
to present evidence in his favor, only that Kelsea is not available 
at that time. Likewise there is no explination as to why the jury 
can't hear the testimony that was just presented to the court by 
Dalrymple about the existence of evidence.that could have made a 
impact on thier decision. Dalrymple contends; The absence of a 
hearing to determlne the admissability of testimony by Kelsea, 
and the presentation of physicall evidence, makes the decision by 
McGloughlin, to end proceedings without the jury having full 
knowledge of the existence of exonerating evidence, Arbitrary. 
see Holmes v. s,c., 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) afferming 
criminal defendants right to 'meaningfull opportunity to present 
a complete defense" ( quoting Crane v. Ky. 476 U.S. 683,690 (1986) 
see also Chambers,410 U.S. at 302 Defendants right to fair 
Pg.15 
opportunity to present defense, whether rooted in the 14th amend-
ments Due Process Clause or 6th Amendments Confrontation or 
Compulsory Process Clause, violated by trial courts exclusion of 
competent, reliable evidence bearing on credibility of confession 
becouse that evidence was central to defendants claim of innocence. 
The evidence and testimony Dalrymple attempted to present at 
trial was not irrelevant, and therefore not harmless error by the 
court. The evidece and testimony was the"whole defense" against 
the allegation of molestation. The jury should therefor been allowed 
to hear it. 
U.S. v.Arbolez,450,F3d 1283, 1295(11th Cir.2006) ( refusal to allow 
defendant to present evidence or argument at forfeiture stage of 
trial not harmless because net beyond reasonable doubt evidence 
would have persuaded jury) 
u.s.v.Safavian,528,F.3d 957,967(D.C. Cir.2008)(erroneous exclusion 
of expert witness testimony not harmless error because testimony 
context crucial to jury's determination) 
u.s.v.Simpson,992F2d 1224,1230(D.C.Cir.1993)(compulsory process 
violated when court refused to aid defendant in securing witness 
who allegedly would have provided exculpatory testimony) 
u.s.v.Turning Bear,357 F.3d 730,735(8th.Cir.2004)(compulsory 
process violated when court refused to admit testimony of character 
witness becouse credibility central issue of case and court failed 
to cite any interest that outweighed probative value of testimony) 





Untimley Waiver to Proceed Pro Se 
In Faretta v.California,theSuprem Court held that an acussed 
has a sixth amendment right to conduct his or her own defen1e in 
a criminal case.The accused must have the ability to conduct the 
organization and content of his defense. Thr defendants request to 
proceed prose should be timely.And a defendant must knowingly & 
intelligently waive the right to counsel.Further the request needs 
to be voluntary. 
In the case of Dalrymple v.State of Idaho,I'll begin by stating 
Dalrymple never makes a request to proceed prose. In reviewing 
the trial transcript,or the previous hearings transcript there is 
nothing to indicate Dalrymple ever made such a request.In fact 
every time the subject is broached it is Judge McGloughlin who 
makes the suggestion. (see trial transcript pg.354,355)&(pretraial 
April 7th 2004) This fact brings into question the voluntariness 
of Dalrymple's decision to fire his attorney.At trial Dalrymple 
wants the court to understand that his attorney,(Mr.Dangelo)has 
not brought forth important evidence.Mr. Dangelo cnfirms and further 
informes the court he also hasen't investigated Mr.Dalrymple's 
defense becouse he doesn't understand. Judge McGloughlin's reply 
to this is to deliver to Dalrymple an ultimatem,(tr. tran.pg.348, 
to 355)Mr.Dalrymple,obviously,there are new issues that have come 
uphere before the court.let me lay out for you how i'm inclined 
to proceed.If you wish to reopen this case and put on testimony 
that you've said you wish to present,thats fine,You can do that 
You will be representing yourself ••••• Dalrymple clearly does not 
make a request to be pro se,Judge McGloughlin tells him he will 
be. It's obvious Dalrymple would not have chosen a prose defense 
had he not been backed into a corner by the court.Also Judge 
McGloughlin should have known that a choice between poor representation 
by unprepaired counsel & self representation,makes a waiver 
Involutary. see(Patterson,487 U.S. 292n.4)(waiver must be voluntary) 
If the defendent must choose between the right to self repr-
esentationand poor council,the choice of the former may be 
considered involuntary. 
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See,e.g.,Pazden v.Maurer424 F.3d303,316,318(3d Cir.2005) 
(involintary waiver when defendant given choice between unprepaired 
council and self representation) 
James v.Brigano,470 F.3d 634,644(6th Cir.2006)(involutary waiver 
when defendant given choice between poor council and self represe-
ntation)~Plumlee v.DelPapa,465 F.3d910,920-22(9th Cir.2006)same; 
U.S. v.Silkwood,893F.2d245,248-49(10th Cir.1989)(involuntary 
waiver when trial court impermissiblytforc~d defendant to choose 
between self-representation and poor counsel. 
Dalrymple was not asking to be prp se he was stating his 
frustratin about DAngelo's performance. Self representation 
was the courts solution to DAngelo's inept performance. The 
ultimatum delivered by the court in this case was untimely at 
the very least and only served to prejudice an already precarious 
defense. 
During the trial is not a good time to change council, 
I shuldn't need to say more than that.The reason for such a choice 
by Judge McGloughlin is unclear but a fair trial and presentation 
ef all the evidence was not a factor. 
What Mr.McGloughlin sucseeded in doing was make an already 
unprepaired defense apear even more unprepaired. 
The choice to procede prose was untimely and prejudical towords 
the defense. Trial court must balance prejuidce to defendant 
that would result if motion to proceed prose denied with 
disruption to proceedings that woul result if motion granted. 
See,e,g.,U.S.Matsushita,794,F.2d46,51(2d Cir.1986) 
u.s.v.Majors,328 F.3d791,794( 5th Cir.2003)(defendants request 
to proceed prose properly denied as untimely becouse made on 
second day of trial);U.S.v.Edelman,458 F.3d 791,808-09(8th Cir.2006) 
(defendants request to proceed prose properly denied as untimely 
because made 5 days before trial and after several continuances) 
u.s.v.McKenna,327 F3d830,844(9th Cir.2003)(defendants request to 
proceed prose denied as untimelybecause motion brought in 
opening brief but not rease4rted until after case went to jury) 
u.s.v.Smith,413 F.3d1253,1281(10th Cir.2005)(defendants request 
to proceed prose properly denied as untimely because request 
made 6 days before trial);U.S.v.young,287 F3d 1352,1354(11th Cir2002) 
(defendants request to proceed prose properly denied as untimely 
because made after jury impaneled) 
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Dalrymple's decision to be prose was forced on him by the 
court and is therefore involuntary. The ultimatum presented 
by the court is untimely and violates Dalrymple's 6th Amendment 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. 
Dalrymple lacked the ability to conduct the organization 
and content of his defense. 
Dalrymple's attorny Mr. DAngelo,had not made a investigation 
into Dalrymple's hypnosis defense. Mr.DAngelo refused to interview 
the prosecution witness,never contacted an expert in hypnosis to 
interview his client,never requested a pre-trial proceedure to 
determin the existence of hypnotic suggestion and it's effect on· 
Kelsea's testimony.Mr.DAngelo claimed to the court that he could 
not establish a foundation for a hypnosis defense when in fact he 
hadn't taken the nessisary steps to do so.He further crippled 
Dalrymple's defese by refuesing to interview Kelsea about hypnosis 
during cross examination and then releasing her from her subpoena 
against the wishes of his client. 
When Dalrymple attempted to conduct a defense there was no~content 
to organize, Mr.McGloughlin, while he was eager to put forth the 
ultimatem that coerced Dalrymple to represent himself,never suggested 
a recess in order to prepair. Mr.DAngelo who was now stand 
by counsil, never suggested a recess,and Dalrymple didn't know 
enough to request time to prepair.see tr. tran.349,thru 356) 
Mr.Dalrymple's supposed waiver was not voluntary, 
it was untimley,and it lacked orginization and content. 
I could attempt to debate whether Dalrymple's waiver was 
knowing and intelligent, however that question has been raised 
and answered by eaqually ineffitiant council. It should be 
pointed out however that to change council during a trial is never 
wise. So safe to say the choice was not intelligent. 
see Plumlee v. DelPapa,465 F.3d 910,920-22( 9th Cir. 2006) 
Plumlee asserted that his lawyer had betrayed him where members 
of the public oefenders office were leaking information about his 
case to another suspect and to the District Attorney. The lack of 
trust on both sides were so severe that Plumlee's attorney not 
only corroborated Plumlee's claim that the relationship had broken 
down,but even made his own motion to be relieved. The District 
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Court denied the motion. Plumlee then chose self-representation 
because of the irreconcilable conflict with his attorney. An 
erroneous denial of a motion to substitute counsel that prompts a 
defendant to choose self-representations warrants reversal despite 
the defendant's "choice" to represent himself. 
Like Plumlee, Dalrymple had also asserted his counsel was 
leaking information to the Prosecutors office.and that the lack of 
trust and communication had never really existed. Dalrymple had 
likewise made motions to the court asking that D'Angelo be replaced. 
Once on 02/19/2004 and again on 04/07/2004, In fact communicatin 
was so poor at the 02/19/04 hearing that Dalrymple and D'Angelo 
were sent out of the courtroom to"settle thier differenses" as a 
result of an argument they were having at the defense table. 
AT the april 7th hearing Dalrymple has filed a motion once 
again to disqualify D'Angelo as his counsel and asking for the court's 
assistance to depose State Witness Shelley Breton. McGloughtin 
informes Dalrymple of his Faretta warnings and gives him the choice 
of D'Angelo as counsel or none at all. Dalrymple states "I need 
an attorney~' Mcgloughlin then questions D 'Angelo about deposing 
Shelley and D'Angelo says" that wont be Nessasary'': 
While D'Angelo doesn't make any motion to be relieved,he does 
reveal to the Court during Trial that he doesn't understand Dalrymple's 
defense, and it" makes no sence to him", and that he hasen't 
spoken with Shelley Or Kelsea about hypnosis, or made contact with 
any proffesionals in the field of hypnosis. see TRial TRan. pg.349 
thru 352. Like PLumlee, D'Angelo corroborates Dalrymple's claims 
about his performance, D'Angelo will ultimatly claim a "conflict" 
existed that prevented him from properly representing Dalrymple. 
McGlouqhlin errored when he denied the motion for substitute 
counsel,and he again errored at trial when he forced Dalrymple to 
choose between D'Angelo~s representation or proceeding Pro-se. 
D'Angelo's representation amounted to no representation at all 
thereby rendering DALRYMPLE"S "choice" Involuntary. 
An involuntary waiver requiers reversal and Dalrymplets conviction 
should be overturned, The sentences vacated, and the case remanded 
in full back to the Disrict Court. 
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ISSUE. 
Ineffective Assistance of Council 
Due To 
Conflict of Interest. 
Barron's Law Dictionary defines Conflict of Interest as, A 
situation in which regard for one duty leads to disregard for another. 
463,F.2d 600,602, or might reasonably be expected to do so. 
IN all cases,once an actual conflict exists,the attorney must 
withdraw and new counsel must be engaged to represent each party. 
To obtain a reversal of a conviction,the defendant must prove 
that(1) counsel's performance"fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness" and(2)counsel's deficient performance prejudiced 
the defendant,resulting in an unrelieable or fundamentally unfair 
outcome in the proceeding. A defendants failure to satisfy one 
prong of the test negates a courts need to consider the other. 
However, In interpreting the prejudice prong, the Supreme Court 
has identified a narrow category of cases in which prejudice is 
pre.sumed: when there has been an"actual or constructive denial 
of the assistance of counsel altogether: "various kinds of State 
interference with counsels performance~ or when counsel is burdened 
by an actual conflict of interest. 
Dalrymple's conviction should be reversed and the case remanded. 
The first time MR.DeAngelo's "conflict" is brought to light is by 
the trial judge,Mr. McGloughlin,see(trial tr. pg.395 Ln.2) 
Mr.DeAngelo had adequetly shown to the court that there was a conflict 
on this issue and that pursuent to the canons of ethics, for him 
to go forward with such evidence,you could concevably be violating 
those canons.And so, that was the baises of the court allowing 
Mr.Dalrymple to proceed to represent himself. 
This declaration was stated after the jury had gone to 
deliberate. The exact nature of Mr.DeAngelo's ~onflictdis never 
disclosed. We don't have the benifit of knowing why Mr.DeAngelo 
thought he might violate his ethics. Or how he could possibly have 
reached such an impasse without a proper investigation. Dalrymple 
questions how the court could consider DeAngelo's performance 
"adequet" knowing he hadn't spoken to any wittness or secured any 
expert testimoney, and he failed to ask for any kind of pre trial 
procedure to determine the existence of hypnosis. (see trial tr. 
pg 350) 
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Dalrymple questions why Mr.DeAngelo didn't withdraw, and allow 
new counsel to be appointed? Mr.DeAngelo knew of Dalrymple's 
desire to present hypnosis as a baises for his defense long before 
the trial or the april 7th hearing. Mr.DeAngelo could have and 
should have withdrawn as Dalrymple's council. 
Whatever DeAngelo's reason for stating a conflict,he2sbould 
not have been allowed to prejudice Dalrymple's defense. 
Dalrymple asserts DeAngelo's performance and his conflict of interest 
justifies presumed prejudice and conviction should be reversed 
and the case remanded. 
STANDARDS for CONFLICT of INTEREST CLAIMS. 
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162,171, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) 
( an "actual conflict" is a" conflict that affected counsel's 
performance--as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. 
Amiel v. U.S. 209 F.3d 195, 199 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
(" To show a lapse in representation, a defendant need not demonstrate 
prejudice--that the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different but for the conflict--but only that some plausible 
alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but 
was not and that the alternative defense was inherently ifi conflict 
with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or 
intere~t's"). 
In Dalrymple's case there is a factual showing of inconsistent 
interests and demonstrates that D'Angelo made a choice between 
possible alternative courses of action, and he failed to elicit 
evidence helpfull to his client. It's not clear how McGloughlin 
can justify appointing D'Angelo standby counsel after he has declared 
a conflict, and after the interview about his failings in gathering 
evidence. At this point McGloughlin Knows D'Angelo is unwilling to 
assist Dalrymple in presenting his defense so unless the court's 
intent is to further cripple Dalrymple's defense, why leave him as 
counsel in any capacity at all? 
u.s.v.Moore, F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 1998) 
conflict where client made repeated representations to the court 
regarding his inability to communicate with attorney). 
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CONSTRUCTIVE DENIAL of COUNSEL. 
Dalrymple's defense councel's performance was not only 
inefective,but D'Angelo abandoned the required duty of loyalty to 
his client; D'Angelo did not simply make poor strategic or tactical 
choices; he acted with reckless dissregard for his client's best 
interest and, apparently, with the intention to weaken his client's 
case. 
Bell v. cone, 535 u.s. 685,152 L.Ed.2d 914,122 s.ct.1843, 
1850 ( 20021 
CRONIC applies when counsel entirly fails to subject the 
prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial testing process. 
The Bell Court clarified that an attorney's failure must be complete, 
noting the difference between the situations addressed by Strickland 
and Cronic is II not of degree but of kind II Bell 122 s.ct. at 1581. 
The court identified three situations implicating the right to 
counsel, where the Court would presume petitioner has been prjudiced. 
First: where petitioner is denied counsel at a critical stage of 
the criminal proceeding. Second; where petitioner is represented 
by counsel at trial, but counsel'' entirely fails to subject the 
prosecution's case to a meaningfull adversarial testing~ Third; 
prejudice is presumed when the circumstances surrounding a trial 
prevent petitioers attorney from rendering effective assistance 
of counsel. 
In the case of State of Idaho v. David Dalrymple, see trial 
tr. Pg. 354 Ln. 20. In satisffying the first situation in Cronic 
the Court (Judge McGloughlin) states; Mr. Dalrymple, obviously, 
there are new issues that have come up here before the court. Let 
me lay out for you how I'm inclined to prceed. If you wish to 
reopen this case and to put on the testimony that you've said you 
wish to present, tha's fine, You can do that. You will be representig 
,yourself because if tou contiue to have Mr. D'Angelo represent you 
this case is closed. 
If you choose to fire him as your counsel and you want to 
proceed on your own--and that means also not only do you take the 
witqess stand and testify, you are subject to recross-examination, 
1 and as far as any closing arguments are concerned, you will be 
makeing those to the jury. 
The ability to gather, orginize, and present evidence, is 
the responsibility of the defense counsel. -
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Dalrymple knows, and the Court has been made aware that D'Angelo 
has not conducted an investigation) see trial tr. Pg.349, 350. 
Dalrymple also refusses to abandon his only defense to the allegation 
of molestation against him. Dalrymple tells the court; This needs 
told, Your Honor. I think I'll represent myself. 
This qualifies as a CRITICAL STAGE of the PROCEEDINGS, 
In fact a reasonable person(whether qualified in law or not) would 
probably consider the entire trial, from start to completion, 
a CRITICAL STAGE, and the decision, that somehow an untrained 
defendant is suddenly qualified midtrial to represent himself is 
unreasonable. 
AS to the SECOND SITUATION presented in Cronic, D'Angelo 
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningfull 
adversarial testing, During cross examination, see trial tr. 
Pgs. 131, thru. 150. D'Angelo fails to ask Kelsea anything about 
hypnosis. D'Angelo failed to gather evidence and present that 
evidence at trial, see trial tran. Pg. 349,thru 353. regarding 
hypnosis, failed to request a pre-trial proceedure that would 
have possibly identified hypnotic suggestion, failed to gather 
physical evidence, journal, cassettes, and computer. D'Angelo 
failed to petition the court requesting an interview with the 
prosecution's witnesses,()A witness has rights and can deniy an 
interview by a defendant or defendant's councel providing those 
rights are not in conflict with a defendant's 14th amendment 
rights.) D'Angelo doesn't ask for a hearing to determine rights 
and at a april 7th pre-trial hearing, tells the court" he sees 
no need to speak with them" When the court is made aware of 
D'Angelo's negligence and questions him, D'Angelo claims he doesn't 
understand Dalrymple's defense, and then somehow claims he has a 
conflict.( The record does not indicate when D'Angelo makes the 
conflict claim) The first mention of conflict is by Judge McGloughlin 
§ee trial tr. Pg. 395, Ln. 2 thru 6; 
D'Angelo's performance,or, lack of performance ,should be enough 
to convince this court of the possibility Dalrymple didn't commit 
the offenses for which he is incarcerated. 
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 152 L.Ed.2d 291(2002) 
( prejudice presumed where counsel was II denied entirely or during 
a critical state of the proceeding") 
Daniels v. Woodford,428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005) 
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INCOMPETENT to ~TAND TRIAL. 
Dalrymple may not have been competant to stand trial due to 
8motional Problems. 
D'Angelo failed to investigate Dalrymple's Mental,or emotional 
condition, Where it was apparent from conversations with Dalrymple 
that his inability to communicate properly, and constant crying 
were symptoms of some type of dissorder. 
Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp. 2d 979(C.D. Cal. 1998) 
Evidentiary hearing was warrented where an issue of fact 
existed whether the defendant was competent to stand trial and 
whether counsel was ineffective in failing to present mitigatigg 
evidence. 
Correll v Stewart, 137F.3d 1404, ( 9th Cir. 1998 ) 
Trial counsels failure to present any evidence of petitioners 
mental illness which may have constitute mitigating circumstances 
requiered an evidentiary hearing to resolve ineffectivness of 
counsel claim. 
U.S. v. Burrows, 872 F.2d 915 ( 9th Cir. 1989 ) 
Trial counsels failure to investigate defendants mental state 
and present evidence, at trial based on defendants mental state 
constituted a significant claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and requiered the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
McLuckie v. Abbott, 337 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2003 ) 
I 
(" a failure to timely investigate a cliemts mental state,let alone 
a failure to assert a mental state defense at trial,falls well 
below an objective standard of reasonableness"where a defendant 
exibits II severe mental problems") 
Evans v. Lewis, 855F.2d 631,636-39 ( 9th Cir. 1988 ) 
( counsel's failure to pursue the possibility of establishing the 
defendant's mental instability constituted ineffective assistance.) 
Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1159-60(9th Cir.1989) 
(" counsel made no tactical decision not to investigate[the defendant's] 
possible mental impairment; he simply failed to do so") 
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COUNSEL'S CUMULATIVE ERRORS 
Cumulative errors, while some are individually harmless, when 
considered together, can prejudice a defendant as much as a single 
reversible error and violate a defendant's right to due process of 
law. The cumulative affect of D'Angelo's errors to wit; Failed to 
investigate,(2) Failed to order pre-trial procedure for the deter-
mination of hypnosis.(3) Failed to properly dissqualify witness 
with prior statements.(4) Failed to object to prosocuter's coaching 
of witness.(5) Failed to cross examine witness about hypnosis.(6) 
{6) Failed to contact an expert in hypnosis to interview his client. 
(7) Failed to contact a mental health profesional when it was 
apparent his client was emotionaly unstable to the point it affected 
his ability to cornrnunicate.(8) As standby counsel he failed to 
request a mistrial.(9) Failed to request time for his client to 
prepair.(10) Failed to gather evidence favorable to his clients 
defense.(11) Failed to withdraw when he had a conflict.(12) And 
Failed to understand his client's case. 
All constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
u.s.v. Troy, F.3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995) 
The Ninth Circuit found the cumulative effect of the errors deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial. This case was not a ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim; rather, the trial court's action 
hindered the defendant's case. 
Wade v. Calderon,29 F.3d 1312 (9th CIR, 1994) 
Defense counsel's cumulative errors and omissions during penalty 
phase constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Thomas v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.1995) 
Counsel's cumulative errors in failing to investigate and impeach 
the jailhouse informants and to rebut the forensic evidence of 
rape cast grave doubt on hi reliability of the entire proceedings 
thus, constituting ineffective assistance of counsel.SEE ALSO-
U.S. v.Kladouris, 739 F.Supp. 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Halton v.Hesson, 
803 F.Supp. 1272(M.D.Tenn1992);U.s.v.Hammonds, 425 F.2d 597(O.C.CIR.1970) 
Hollines v. Estelle, 569 F.Supp.146(W.D.Tex.1983);Jemison v. Foltz, 
672 F.Supp.1002(E.D.Mich.1987); Henry v. Scully, 78 F.3d 51(2nd Cir.1996) 
Harris by and through Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d1432 (9th Cir.1995) 
Harris v. Housewright,697 F.2d 202(8th Cir.1982); Harris v. Towe~s, 
405 F.Supp. 497(D.Del.1974);Nealy v.Cabana,764 F.2d 1173(5th Cir.1985) 
D'Angelo's failure to lay proper foundation for the admission 
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of hypnosis evidence, along with his unwillinigness to develope 
any semblance of a defense theory constitutes Ineffective assistance 
of Coynsel.and deprived Dalrymple of a fair trial. 
The allegations presented here are easily provable with a ~@t~~w 
of the record,TRial tran. Pg.349 thru 353, D'Angelo addmitts to 
the allegations about failing to investigate and failing to develop 
foundation. and Trial TRan. Pg. 131 thru 156; During the cross 
examination of Kelsea he fails to ask about hypnosis, and at the 
conclusion of his interview he releases her from her subpoena 
against his client's wishes. He not only fails to ask Kelsea about 
hypnosis, he manages to fix it so nobody can interview her about 
hypnosis. 
D'Angelo's performance was so poor ,[whether intentional or 
if he really is that poor an attorney] that he did a better job 
for the prosecution's case than his client's. D'Angelo's Cumulative 
Errors lay doubt on the conviction, and expose the possibility 
Dalrymple was convicted for acts he did not commit • 
. cdr 0Dalry1nplu' s conviction shold be overturned. 
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ABUSE of DISCCRETION. 
Dalrymple alledges the court ( Judge McGloughlin) did abuse 
his discretion in COERCING Dalrymple to proceed Pr0-Se after 
Dalrymple's counsel (D'Angelo) had claimed a conflict. 
The record does not indicate exactly when D'Angelo claims he 
has a conflict. The first time conflict is mentioned is by Judge 
McGloughlin, see TRial TR. PG. 394 thru 395.; "Now the court today 
released counsel based upon this evidence that Mr. Dalrymple 
submitted to the jury regarding hypnotism of the child. The baises 
for the court's decision in that regard is that Mr. D'Angelo had 
adequatley shown to the court that there was a conflict on this 
issue and that pursuant to the canons of ethics, for him to go 
forward with such evidence, you could conceivably be violating, 
those canons. And so, that was the basis of the court allowing 
Mr.Dalrymple to proceed to represent himself with the assistance 
of counsel,( D'Angelo couldn't properly prepare for trial yet 
somehow he is qualified to be standby counsel) Mr. D'Angeloc 
present, and he has been throught the course of the trial. 
(Dalrymple had asked the court to replace D'Angelo on at least 
two seperate hearings prior to trial becouse he feared D'Angelo 
would do exactly what he did. Judge McGloughlin had refused. 
Now during trial he makes Dalrymple disscharge his attorney if 
he wants to present evidence in his defense.) 
ON page 354 of trial trans. Ln. 16; the court takes a recess 
This is after Dalrymple has told the court about hypnosis and 
that D'Angelq was supposed to have assisted him in it's presentation. 
The court has questioned D'Angelo about" was he advised of this 
hypnotism in advance of trial" and" did he inquire of the witnesses 
in this case, Kelsea or her mother, as to whether or not this had 
ever occurred~· 
Dalrymple concludes that since D'Angelo makes no declaration 
about conflict before this recess, and since McGloughlin makes him 
choose between representation and evidence directly after the recess, 
D'Angelo must have made this revelation known to the court during 
the recess. 
Judge McGloughlin makes a poor choice in contiuing the trial. 
Whether intentionaly, or, by accident, he forces a choice on the 
defenant which would not have happened had he listened during pre-trial 
hearings; see pre-trial April 7th. 
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Dalrymple should have been appointed different counsel. 
Instead McGloughlin creates a further conflict by allowing D'Angelo 
to contradict Dalrymple and undermine his veracitY.c which left 
Dalrymple without counsel. McGloughlin abused his discretion in 
failing to apoint new counsell, Failing to declare a Misstrial, or 
at the very least, Failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
In allowing D'Angelo to remain as standby counsel McGloughlin 
creats a charade so later he can claim Dalrymple was never denied 
counsel at a critical stage, when in fact he was. And again whether 
by intent or accident, McGloughlin has created,and presents, to the 
jury, a picture of instability in the defense. Further prejudicing 
Dalrym~le's defense. 
Dalrymple was deprived of DUE PROCESS by the court and 
Dalrymple shouldhave been appointed different counsel. 
McGloughlin abused his discretion in insissting Dalrymple continue 
whenhe knew D'Angelo had not prepaired for trial, hadn't gathered 
any evidence, so nothing would be available to present except 
Dalrymple's claim without any phisical evidence to substatiate his 
claims. Judge McGloughlin's actions are sufficiant to justify 
a finding of PRESUMED PREJUDICE and this conviction should be 
overturned the sentence vacated, and this case remanded in it's 
entierty • 
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON POST CONVICTION. 
Dalrymple was represented by Cristopher Scwartz at the July 20 
and August 11,2009 Post Conviction hearing that resulted in a 
confermation of Dalrymple's previous convictions. 
Mr. Scwartz failed to bring all the issues to the courts 
attention and failrd to bring evidence to support the issue he did 
bring. see post con. tr. pg.197 thnu 214. Judge McGloughlin's 
assesment of the case. 
Throughout McGloughlin's conclusory remarks he contiually makes 
mention of Schwartz'es failure to present any evidence to substatiate 
Dalrymple's case,And as a Direct Result McGloughlin Denies the 
Petition for Post-Conviction. 
At the time of Dalrymple's Post-Conviction hearing the case 
of Martinez v.Ryan had not yet been decided. This is significant 
becouse at the time a Defendant was precluded from Declareing 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claims against thier Post-Conviction 
counsel. This situation has .ghanged. 
Schwartz and McGloughlin's actions and statements seem to 
reflect an attitude of indifference to the testimony presented as 
McGloughlin happily points out Schwartz'es inefficiencies in order 
to clear himself and D Angelo of any wrongdoing and justify denial 
of Dalrymple's Post-Conviction. 
At the time McGloughlin, Schwartz, D Angelo and even the 
Prosecutor Ms.Fisher are confident there can be no recourse. 
This allows them to say and do whatever they want as long as 
Dalrymple remains convicted. 
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GUILTY AT ANY COST. 
KANGAROO COURT. 
Barrens Law Dictionary defines Kangaroo Court as a court that 
has no legal authority, and that disregards all the rights normally 
afforded to persons; it's conclusions are not legaly binding. 
This is a colloquial term refering to a court that is biased 
against a party and thus renders an unfair verdict,or judgment. 
The trial c~urt,(Judge McGloughlin.specificaly) did engage in 
conduct and desisions which undermined the principles of justice 
and undermined Dalrymple's ability to have a fair Hearing either 
Trial,or on Post Conviction. 
Dalrymple's counsel at both hearings failed to bring and present 
evidence in support of Dalrymple's defense,(but it wouldn't have 
mattered) Cristopher Schwartz (counsel at Post- Conviction) failed 
to present issues available to him in the trial and pre- trial record. 
D'Angelo's performance at trial was clearly defitiant. Yet 
McGloughlin somehow manages to claim Dalrymple was "adequetly" 
represented. 
Judge McGloughlin's performance at the conclusion of Post-
Conviction proceedings should stand as a beacon for any Jurist 
wishing to Ignore DUE PROCESS and Embrace the GUILTY AT ANY COST 
philosophy. see Post Conviction tran. pg.197 thru 214. 
McGloughlin begins by quoting the standard for Strickland he 
even spells S-T-R-C-K-L-A-N-D for those of us who happen to be 
illiterate.(condesending) He explains the standard but{coincidentaly) 
leaves out the exception- That the Supreme Court has identified a 
narrow catagory of cases in which Prejudice is Presumed. When there 
has been an Actual or Constructive Denial of the assistance of 
Counsel altogether. When counsel is burdened by an Actual Conflict 
Of Interest,or when there are Various kinds of State Interferance. 
In these situations Prejudice is so likly to occure that a case by 
case inquery is unnecesary.(McGloughlin doesnt want to make the 
remotest suggestion that Dalrymple may be correct so he'll just 
pick the parts that give his agenda the edge. 
I'm going to paraphrase and condence Judge McGloughlin's speach 
selecting segments that hopefully retain for the reader,the essance 
of his attitude towards thed~:=<!e~ridant and the defendant's rights• 
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on pg.197 ln. 20 Mcglaughlin continues "ther's also the 
presumption that counsel's performance is within a WIDE RANGE of 
Proffesional Assistance,That it is SOUND TRIAL STRATIGY and he quotes 
Davis v.state. /.s1t.1:. flt;S-r't1.01t11'&"e-r:row fh.J'l'f t.;t/. it. f"t1fl.,; {.)Gr 1«&, 
~/£., AL5 C1 -r'Rrtil .,-ejJ,.I!, ~ (,'"a,. 31/<c .,-/.f{lv ~55 
( D'angelo has testified that he failed to understand Dalrymple's 
defense and failed to gather evidence, Failed to cross examine 
witnesses about hypnosis,Failed to assist his client in presenting 
hi defence, and claimed a CONFLICT existed that hindered his 
performance at trial) The range of PROFFESIONAL ASSISTANCE must be 
really wide for McGloughlin's way of interpretation. Any reasonable 
person would have thought that with D'Angelo's addmission of all 
those facts the concesus would have gone from effective assistance 
to ineffective assistance in record time. But not McGloughlin. 
On pg.198 McGloughlin states; "And I can't find from the record 
that there was aconflict between Mr.D'Angelo and Mr.Dalrymple(your 
joking right?) as to,whether you want to refer to it as a personality 
CONFLICT,(now he's going to contradict himself) A conflict that"s 
so impacted the attorney- client relationship, That it prevented 
.Mr.D'Angelo fromrepresenting Mr. Dalrymple zealously and prudently 
and proffesionaly in the course of thier relationship.(What record 
is this guy reading from-D'Angelo's testimony was that Dalrymple's 
defense was"STUPID"and he [D'Angelo] didn't "UNDERSTAND" and that 
Dalrymple was "DIFFICULT" to DEAL WITH" therby creating a situation 
which compelled him to claim "CONFLICT" at Dalrymple's trial. 
McGloughlin presided over the February 2004 hearing to disqualify 
D'Angelo where the argument at the defense table prompted him to 
send both D'Angelo and Dalrymple out of the courtroom to"settle 
thier differences". Dalrymple asked the court again for a change 
of counsel at an April 7th pre-trial hearing; Yet from the record 
McGloughlin can't find a conflict that impacted attorney/client 
relationshipl, (Does McGloughlin know what CONFLICT means) 
on pg.198 ln. 20-McGloughlin continues- There was clearly a 
CONFLICT as to this issue of what evidence would be presented and 
what evidence wouldn't( Ok LETS THINK- SHOULD A DEFENDANT BE 
ALLOWED TO PRESENT HIS EXPLANATION OF EVENTS OR, SHOULD HIS ATTORNEY 
MAKE THEM UP FOR HIM?) But ,Mcglaughlin says, I can't find that 
that so permeated this attorney/client relationship that Mr.D Angelo 
did not completly and diligently represent Mr. Dalrymple. 
On pages 199 and 200 McGloughlin rambles on about D angelo's 
review of the prosecution evidence and the presentation of said 
.- .... .:.,:a __ ~ 
and how that was not ineffective. 
On pg.200 ln.25 thru pg.201 
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I'm satisfied from the totality of the evidence Mr.Dangelo, 
over a series of meetings,becouse there was some contention. It 
Wasn't about accusatory remarks by Mr.D Angelo.A CLSSIC CONFLICT 
would be,This is an offer you got to take,and it's a waste of time 
to go to trial.( Once again McGloughlin wants to discuss the CONFFLICT 
that he can't find from the record. Only now he wants to differentiate 
between CLASIC CONFLICT and what? regular old run of the mill 
conflict.Well at least we now know it existes.) 
McGloughlin again; pg,201 ln.6 
No,this is one where it was permeated with this whole issue 
of a meeting between a victim,or at least a parent of a victim,and 
a prosecutor and a defense attorney. And that was first and formost 
on his mind,and I understand he had a belief that if he ••• and if 
that meeting occured there would be this revelation about being 
hypnotized and that there would be a recanting of earlier testimony, 
(McGloughlin says this like it's the first time HE's heard it) 
But I can't find that Mr.D Angelo to have not made a formal! motion 
that that was ineffective assistance of counsel.(There's news) 
ln.18- Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was,(OK LET'S 
ASSUME IT WAS INEFFECTIVE) Ther's been certainly no showing here 
that such a meeting would have changed the outcome of the case.To 
my knowledge,There's no evidence before this court about any 
recantation by the victimin the case.(THAT"S EXACTLY THE POINT 
DALRYMPLE HAS TRIED TO MAKE) And on a related note, There is no 
testimony before this court of an expert nature as to the issue of 
hypnosis.(That was one of Dalrymple's claims,that Dangelo had 
failed to bring any expert tetimony. Now McGloughlin points out 
that Dalrymple's current councel [Schwartz] is also negligent in 
the same area) 
pg.202 ln.2 But I'll find that Mr.D Angelo over a period of 
time did advise the defendant of his constitutional rights. I know 
that the courts precluded from probably looking at the court record, 
but the court also advised the defendant of his constitutional 
rights,but I'm satisfied that Mr.D Angelo did that and made it clear 
to Mr Dalrymple that he could testify,and that he could confront 
his accusers and testify on his own behalf,and that,in fact,did 
occur. (Dalrymple's testimony after D Angelo claimed conflict and 
he took the stand was without benifit of counsel to present issues, 
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and it was hindered by prosecuter and McGloughlin's interference. 
When Dalrymple tried to recall Kelsea for testimpny about hypnosis 
he was denied.(Apparently someone should explain defendant"rights" 
to McGloughlin) 
on line 12 McGloughlin;with allegation 6 •• "failure to interview 
witnesses,discuss presentation of my defense.Mr.D Angelo never 
interviewed the witnesses and was unable to perform any investigation 
into the allegations~ 
Well I'll note for the record that on reviewthat he certainly 
called the witnesses that he had been asked to call.The second prong 
of Strickland is,okay,who were the witnesses that weren't interviewed 
and what would they have testified that would have changed the 
outcome of the case. (McGloughlin has heard testimony from D Angelo 
about how he didn't interview Shelley or Kelsea and wouldn't ask 
any questions about hypnosis when they testified,D Angelo told 
~hat Dalrymple had asked him to file motions and try to set up an 
interview with Shelley so that testimony could be brought to trial, 
and he [D Angelo] had refused.D Angelo also testified Dalrymple had 
wanted him to contact a expert in hypnosis to interview with and 
substantiate his testimony.Which again D Angelo failed at.McGloughlin 
has heard sworn testimony from D Angeol and Dalrymple and he himself 
has just stated "and I understand he had a belief that if this 
meeting occured there would be this ·revelation about being hypnotized 
and that there would be a recanting of earlier testimony,JYet his 
[McGloughlin's] next statement is •• Ther's been no proper evidence 
to the court who those specific witnesses were and,what,if any - _______ _, ...__ ----
evidence they would have gresented that would have potentially 
ehanged the outcome in this case. (More Contradiction) 
pg.203 ln.4 Mr.D Angelo did have investigators,assigned 
investigators.!'M NOT SAYING THAT THEY INTERVIEWED EVERY WITNESS, 
BUT I HAVE YET TO HEAR A SPECIFIC NAME OF A WITNESS THAT WAS ASKED 
BY MR.DALRYMPLE TO BE INTERVIEWED AND WHAT THAT WITNESS WOULD HAVE 
SAID THAT WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.( The ability 
to ignore testimony must be a prerequiset to being a judge) 
pg.203 ln.11 McGloughlin then goes to talk about the 
deposition issues •• Was it ineffective of Mr.D Angelo to pursue a 
motion,(to not pursue is what he should have said) Well you look 
at the rule,The rulr 15 of the criminal rules, You can take a 
deposition of a witness if they're going to be unavailable to 
testify at trial or prevented from attending a trial,Or that the 
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testimony of the witness is Material and that it is necessary to 
take the deposition of the witness in order to prevent a failure 
of justice. (That's exactly what Dalrymple was trying to prevent, 
A Failure of Justice)(McGloughlin throughout his speach inadvertaantly 
makes the case for ineffective assistance at the first collateral 
proceeding.But since the Martinez V.Ryan case hasen't been heard 
yet, he obviously belives he can lay one attorney's misconduct off 
on the other and continue on ignoreing the facts.) 
pg.203 ln.21 •• Well,okay,ther's been no showing made here by 
Mr.Dalrymple how a deposition would have changed the outcome of 
the case,(And the aword for ineffective assistance at a collateral 
proceeding goes to Mr.Schwartz who advised Dalrymple he wouldn't 
need to show that)(Honestly I wish attorneys would wear a sign 
stating thier a sellout) 
(McGloughlin is once again avoiding the facts,or twisting them. 
He's been told by Dalrymple and Dalrymple's counsel how a deposition 
would have changed the outcome of the case.)ln23 •• and there's 
certainly been no showing here that Mr.D Angelo in declining to 
take that invitation by Mr.Dalrymple,that he was ineffective in 
his assistance to Mr.Dalrymple in his defense.(Dalrymple never 
invited D Angelo to anything,He told him he wanted him [D Angelo] 
to do his job.)(It doesn't matter what evidence is brought or 
what Dalrymple says,McGloughlin and D Angelo seem to have a you 
tell the lie and i'll swear to it agreement that can't be overcome 
through testimony) 
pg.204 ln.11 •• Well first of all,Mr.Dalrymple did get to testify 
as to what he did.(McGloughlin knows better,he made the rulings 
that prevented testimony) •• Mr.D angelo articulated four resons why 
he did not pursue this hypnosis testimony.(Now D Angelo's excuses 
will be accepted like he is an aµthority on hypnosis) He outlined 
those,and I think that those were very valid reasons why he was 
concerned,and it created an ethical dilema for him in that,Even 
assuming if he'd asked about how he performed the hypnosis, It 
would have still required testimony from the defendant as to whether 
or not this person was in a hypnotic state(what?) and I would submit 
that does require some expertise. ln.22 •• And,secondly,there was 
grave inconsisticies between when this hypnosis alledgedly occured, 
and we come back even earlier to where the victim had talked about 
earlier, lQwcf'and laciviousconduct (Now McGloughlin I s an expert on 
wha~'s possible through hypnosis.Let's not get an expert and conduct 
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a proper investigation.)(Everyone in this case is a exprt except 
the guy who was actually there. And of course we wouldn't want 
any real proffesional to coroberate his testimony) 
pg.205 ln.1 •• it just was a recipe for disaster in terms,of 
any kind of defense. 
But addressing that issue,! think certainly the defendant has 
a right to present evidence to a jury,(well thats a relief) 
and if they choose to do so in violation of the standards of ethics 
or proffesional standards of attorneys,that the defendants can do 
that pro-se,but they can't do it with the assistance of,or through 
the direction of an attorney.(Correct me if I'm wrong,but did McGloughlin 
just call Dalrymple a LIAR? If that's the case why doesn't he or 
either of Dalrymples attorneys,or[the prosecuter for that matter] 
want an investigation into this hypnosis?)(~veryone's an expert-
except the expert •• WHO"S NOT PRESENT) 
ln.11 And I thought that Mr.Dangelo's explanation as to why 
he would not be a part of such testimony was clear,and I can't find 
that that was ineffective assistance of counsel per-se,(Let's see-Q 
D Angelo refused to assist his client in any real manner then claims 
conflict when he's called on his performance.And trys to lay the 
blame for poor performance on his client.BUT HE GAVE A GOOD EXCUSE 
SO THAT'S NOT INEFFECTIVE)(What does McGloughlin consider ineffective) 
ln.14 to 15 •• and assuming that it was ,assuming that he should have 
gone ahead and asked him that,A.he did testify that he had--I can't 
find whether it came from Mr.Dalrymple examining himselfpro-se or 
haveing Mr.D Angelo ask him those questions,But that fact in and 
of itself would have changed the outcome of the verdict in this 
case.(Sometimes it's hard to follow McGloughlins oration,He talks 
alot of double-talk with no real meaning)(Whatever it was it would 
have changed the verdict)ln.22 •• And then we talked about Mr.D Angelo's 
effort to obtain an expert becouse that is a fair area of inquiry. 
(Here we go again) I think Mr.D Angelo made a good faith effort to 
try and find an expert.He talked to faculty at Boise State UNiversity 
here.He had his investigater look into it. But even assuming that 
his efforts in that regard were defitiant,I think I'd come back to 
what I alluded to earlier. There is no evidence before this court 
from a hypnotist that this testimony and the incredible suggestion 
made to a child that she has been sexually abused,when in fact, 
she has not been sexually abused,and for this theory or defense 
imposed by Mr.Dalrymple,there's no showing that such a suggestion 
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is even possible.Perhaps it is possible,but I'd have to speculate. 
(With this statement McGloughlin hits two attorneys with one 
stone.Niether D Angelo or Schwartz have presented any expert 
testimony.They both claim they can't locate an expert,yet D Angelo 
quotes the Iwakiri case which had two experts from boise,and 
supposedly spoke to faculty at ~oise State who was knowledgeable 
in hypnosis.Yet no one interviews his client or testifies in court. 
Schwartz and Dalrymple have had conversations about this very 
subject,and Dalrymple has supplied Schwartz with the names of books 
on hypnosis.During cross examination he asks D Angelo about books, 
Yet for some reason Swartz is under the impression that it is 
unnesasary to present that evidence in lue of expert testimony.) 
(Ineffective Assistance by both D Angelo and Schwartz) 
pg.206 ln.14 •• The burden is upon the petitioner to show that, 
a,this hypnosis occured,perhaps through having a hypnotist 
interview the victim,(Well look who just showed up to the party.) 
(Where was that reasoning during trial,when he was making Dalrymple 
discharge his attorney and proceed prp-se)? •• or review thier 
testimony.Iwould simply have to speculate as to whether or not an 
expert in hypnosis could have come in and said,Well this is all 
not only possible,I just have nothing.(Now after the statements 
McGloughlin just made,that point directly to glaring d@ficiencies 
in both D Angelo's and Schwartz's presentations of Oalrymple's 
case,he still manages to condone both attorney's actions and excuses.) 
pg.206 ln.22 •• And,again,I know that both Mr.D Angelo and, 
frankly,Mr.Schwartz,you've tried today to do your best to find 
somebody that could come in and kind of focus these issues and 
structure them in a way where the court could look at this and say 
okay,well,an expert has said he has an opinion that perhaps this 
childs testimony had the kind of syntax and rythm to it that indicates 
that she may have been hypnotized; That this kind of hypnotic 
suggestion is possible,and could,infact,have taken place.It's all 
speculation. And again,I can't find that even though he may have 
--Mr.D Angelo may have perhaps taken additional steps to try and 
connect with an expert in hypnosis,that even that was deficiant on 
his part.(First McGloughlin congragulates them for doing there 
•best•,Then he explains the evidence that's missing,Then he states 
D Angelo could have done a better job locating an expert.Then 
somehow he finds that's not defitiant.)He even goes on and says •• 
pg~207 ln.13 •• there's been no showing here that the outcome of the 
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case would have changed in any way.(With this statement he manages 
to again point out Schwartz's ineffective assistance) 
pg.207 ln.15 •• I hope I've addressed the issue of investigator's 
claim of hypnosis.I think again Mr.Dangelo was constrained as far 
as,to a certain extent,not only finding an expert on the subject 
but what sort of contact,if any,would have been allowed with the 
victim in this case in light of the no-contact order and the victim 
rights.(D Angelo quoted Iwakiri which had two experts from Boise 
in hypnosis,,On page 161 line 10 of post conviction tran. D Angelo 
testified he spoke to a "Dr.Beaver""becouse we used him extensivly" 
so,we can probably deduce D Angelo's testimony about not being able 
to find an expert,is not true. And as far as contact with the victim 
--Well acording to his own testimony •• He Never Tried!) 
(McGloughlin has Double-Talked and contradicted himself in an 
attempt to make D Angelo and Schwartz sound like hard working and 
honest attorneys who had done a competent job for Dalrymple,When 
in fact,That's just not true.)[On page 93 ln.12 post con.] D Angelo 
states he was chief counsel for the Idaho Dept.of Health and Welfare 
for about 11 years.That entailed representing seven divisions. The 
Division of Welfare, The Division of Family and Childrens Services, 
The Division of Enviromental Quality, The Division of Mental health 
that ran The institutions at State Hospital South and North,And 
the Idaho State School and Hospital, and the Division of Public 
Health ••• Now, Considering this vast resevour of mental health 
profesionals •• How could he not find somebody knowledgable in HYpnosis 
whom his client could interview with? •• If as he says--He Tried. 
Back on record Pg.207 ln.22 to Pg.20~.L~.23 is more Doubletalk 
then on line 24 •• Mr.D Angelo tried to work around this whole issue 
of this meeting between Mr.Dalrymple and the victim and the mother. 
That was a real IMPEDIMENT(When did gathering possible evidence to 
verify what your client was telling you become a IMPEDIMENT?) 
Pg.209 Ln.1 •• That was a real IMPEDIMENT that was brought about by 
Mr.Dalrymple's actions.Certainly not •• and it did IMPEDE Mr.D Angelo's 
ability to manage this case and handle it in a normal amount of 
time and effort and energy,and he took extra time,energy and effort 
(OKAY the guy's a saint.We get it) to make additional contacts with 
Mr.Dalrymple to try to work through this constant discusion about 
this meeting process ••• (After McGloughlin nominates D Angelo for 
sainthood he then )(ln.14 •• ) Mr.D Angelo's handling of the preparation 
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of his client for trial was competent.It was profesional:It was 
not defitient.He certainly went over these areas that he was going 
to cover with Mr.Dalrymple.It wasn't as though he got on the witness 
stand cold.He adequetly prepared him for trial and for the issue 
of testifying before the jury ••• (Except for that one little IMPEDIMENT 
called evidence) 
Ln.22 •• Again asking the witnesses questions about hypnosis, 
I can't find --I mean,the testimony that was presented was that he 
had hypnotized this child outside the presence of anyone eles,and 
ther's certainly no evidence here that by asking the victim witness 
to testify whether or not she'd been hypnotized,again,I don't profess 
to be extremly knowledgeable about hypnosis,(Finaly, A statement 
we can all agree on.And if your not knowledgable about hypnosis, 
(Then stop making determinations about it,Or what Dalrymple is trying 
to tell you •• CONTACT A PROFESSIONAL.) •• But that's kind of the whole 
process.You've been hypnotized and you don't know it. 
On pg.210 ln.7 •• (Mcgloughlin really begins to whitewash the 
case) •• Again,even assuming that he'd asked a question about hypnotic 
suggestion,There's been no showing here made that that would have 
somehow changed the outcome of the case,As far as something for 
the jury to consider.{Again,Ineffective assistance by Schwartz.) 
I've touched upon this, allowing Mr.Dalrymple to testify about 
hypnosis.He ultimatly,again,was allowed to testify about it.I've 
talked about whether or not that was done through self-examination 
by Mr.Dalrymple from representinghimself or from Mr.D Angelo,and 
again,I can'tfind that ,though there was testimony here by Mr. 
Dalrymple that he thought he looked perhaps idiotic asking himself 
those questions, I can't find that that was a result of whether or 
not he was asking the questions or his attorney was asking him the 
questions ••• 
(RIDICULOUS!! I really don't understand why McGloughlin's 
makeing statements like this.Wouldn't it be easier to jus~ admit 
D Angelo didn't do his job and the court errored in coercing 
Dalrymple who was unprepared and untrained to be pro-se in the 
middle of the trial.Why continue to lie about how it didn't affect 
the defense? Honestly I feel dumber for having read McGloughlin's 
assesments.It's like he's talking to stupid children.Doesn't he 
realize how much money and time he's caused to be wastedon the 
incompetent performances of D Angelo and now Schwartz? And every 
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time he says-"There's been no showing,or,no evidence presented here, 
or,I can't find from the totality of the record any evidence before 
the court here today~ He makes the case for ineffective assistance, 
both at trial and at post-conviction.Becouse if either D Angelo or 
Schwartz had done a proper job of representing thier client the 
evidence wouldhave been there.)(Although judging from McGloughlin's 
statements,He would have found a way to ignore that also.) 
Pg.210 Ln.24 •• He says it was hurtfull and prejudicial to his 
case,again,I cannot find from the record before the court that,even 
assuming that,I just don't see where there was prejudice.(Dalrymple's 
attorney completly failed to challenge the prosecutions case,Refused 
to investigate,Abandoned his clients only defense,and Claimed a 
Conflict existed that prevented him from assisting Dalrymple. The 
Court in response to this revelation Coerced Dalrymple into A Pr0-se 
defense that was unprepaired,and without physical evidence. 
DALRYMPLE TRIED TO TESTIFY IN THE NARATIVE BUT DUE TO PROSECUTOR 
OBJECTIONS AND THE COURT'S INTERFERANCE WAS UNABLE TO TESTIFY ABOUT 
HYPNOSIS.DALRYMPLE'S TESTIMONY WITHOUT COROBERATING EVIDENCE TO 
VERIFY HIS STATEMENTS WAS A FOOLS ERRAND.WHEN MCGLOUGHLIN HAD 
KNOWLEDGE OF CONFLICT HE CHOSE TO COERCE DALRYMPLE INTO A PRO-SE 
DEFENSE RATHER THAN HAVE A HEARING TO DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE 
CONFLICT.HE WOULDN'T EVEN MENTION THE CONFLICT UNTIL AFTER THE JURY 
HAD GONE TO DELIBERATE,THEREBY DEPRIVEING DALRYMPLE OF THE OPORTUNITY 
TO REQUEST A HEARING.SOMEHOW HE JUSTIFIED MAKEING DANGELO STANDBY 
COUNSEL AFTER HE CLAIMED CONFLICT ••• ! GUESS IT SHOULD COME AS NO 
SURPRISE WHEN HE CAN'T FIND PREJUDICE.) 
Then on Pg.211 Ln.3 it's as if McGloughlin can't keep himself 
from saying dumb shit ••• He got the testimony out.He was able to 
describe what he did.The jury got to consider it as an issue.He 
got to present his defense.I can't find that,again,the fact that 
Mr.Dalrymple elicited that testimony from himself versus through 
his attorney,that that rose to the level of either,A,ineffective 
assistance of counsel,or that it would have changed the outcome 
of the case.(APARENTLY MCGLOUGHLIN BELIEVES DEFENDANTS DON'T NEED 
OR DESERVE THE BENIFIT OF COUNCEL TO PRESENT THIER DEFENSE.) 
Pg.211Ln.12 •• Yes,there were objections about which Mr.Dalrymple 
had been warned regarding form of questioning--The rules of evidence, 
but again that was a risk he chose to take.(DALRYMPLE HAD OPPORTUNITY 
TO BE PRO-SE BEFORE THIS TRIAL BEGAN.IF DALRYMPLE HAD CHOSEN TO 
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GO TO TRIAL WITHOUT COUNSEL THAT CHOICE WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE BEFORE 
THIS TRIAL COMMENCED.IN FACT EVERY TIME DALRYMPLE WAS QUESTIONED 
ABOUT PROCEEDING WITHOUT COUNSEL HE STATES HE NEEDS AN ATTORNEY. 
FOR MCGLOUGHLIN TO SAY DALRYMPLE CHOSE SELF REPRESENTATION IS A 
GROSS MISSREPRESENTATION OF THE FACTS.) 
Pg.211 Ln.16 •• Again I ruled that Mr.D Angelo was ethicaly 
precluded(CHALLENGED)for going into this area for the reasons he 
set forth here today,(D Angelo had testified HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND 
DALRYMPLE'S DEFENSE AND IT DIDN'T MAKE SENCE TO HIM,AND DALRYMPLE 
WAS ACTING STUPID,AND THAT HE DIDN'T CARE WHAT DALRYMPLE SAID 
BECOUSE HE WAS GOING TO DO IDT HIS WAY.) Pg.211 Ln.18 •• and I do agree 
that in order for Mr.Dalrymple to testify as to his abilities as 
a hypnotist,there has to be some training,experiance or knowledge 
that is over and above that of simply an individual.(NOW AGAIN 
MCGLOUGHLIN'S AN EXPERT IN HYPNOSIS AND DALRYMPLE'S SIMPLE.) 
LN.24 •• CERTAINLY,WE DO ALLOW A CERTAIN degree of opinion testimony, 
But this is one that calls for expertise,And there's been no showing 
showing here that,By a hypnotist or someonewho's experienced in 
that area,that,in fact,a lesser standard is required.I think you'll 
have to speculate.(INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY SWARTZ) 
Pg.212 Ln.s •• so,again, a conclusory remark in the affidavit 
was that he was forced to go to trial with no defense theory and 
no lawyer,and to the contrary, he had an attorney that was prepared 
and did cover his denials of any wrongdoing.As far as when he 
testified,and he was allowed to present his defense theory. 
Again,I can'tfind that the presentation of that defense theory 
was in any way impacted,or to change the outcome of this case 
becouse it was done Pro-Se versus through his counsel.(IF IT DOESN'T 
MAKE ANY DIFFERANCE THEN WHY DO YOU SUPPOSE WE HAVE ATTORNEYS AT 
ALL,AND WHY WOULD THE SUPREME COURT MAKE AN ISSUE OF EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE.)(MCGLOUGHLIN'S MAKING STUPID,STUPID STATEMENTS) 
Pg.212 Ln.17 •• Based upon those findings,the court then would 
conclude that the totality of the evidence here,That there was not 
ineffective assistance of counsel with that one somewhat minor, 
exception,and that was whether or not Mr.D Angelo had fjully and 
completly attempted to find an expert on hypnosis.And when you 
look at the standard in Strickland again,i don't want to send the 
higher court a conflicting ruleing on this:But I think it may be 
that there could have been possibly a little more effort in that 
area.I frankly cannot find from the totality of the evidence that 
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that one issue rose to the level of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.(MCGLOUGHLIN HAS TAKEN FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE,FAILURE TO 
GATHER PHYSICAL EVIDENCE,FAILURE TO INTERVIEW WITNESSES,ABANDONED 
G,LIENTS ONLY DEFENSE,D ANGELO'S CONFLICT OF INTREST,COMBINED WITH 
A REFUSAL TO ASSIST IN HIS CLIENT'S DEFENSE •• THIS IS WHAT DANGELO 
REDILY TESTIFYS TO HAVEING DONE.YET MCGLOUGHLIN SOMEHOW TRIMS IT 
ALL DOWN TO "ONE MINOR EXCEPTION") 
Pg.213 Ln.7 •• Again,even assuming that it had,I can't find from 
the totality of the evidence before the court here today,That it 
would have changed the outcome of this case.(ANOTHER STATEMENT OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY POST CONVICTION COUNSEL-SCHWARTZ) 
(MCGLOUGHLIN BURIES THE ATTORNEY ON POST CONVICTION IN AN EFFORT 
TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL ATTORNEYS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.) 
In Ln.24 Mcglaughlin says "I find it interesting that clearly 
Mr.Dalrymple wanted an expert in hypnosis ••• 
He then goes on to give an excuse why it doesn't matter.Then 
delivers to D Angelo a final attaboy for his performance and 
completly denies the petition for post conviction. 
CONCLUSION. 
This is not about whether Dalrymple was told his consttutional 
rights.This is a question of what must Dalrymple do to get fair 
treatment under those rights? 
Dalrymple has maintained Actual Innocence,That he never commited 
the physical acts upon Kelsea that were the baises for the conviction 
of the sexual molestation charges. 
Dalrymple clearly wanted to present hypnosis and evidence of 
hypnosis as the foundation of his defense. 
D Angelo's failure to investigate left Dalrymple unprepared 
at his trial,and Schwartz'es representation on Post-Conviction 
lacked that same component,Which was evidence of hypnosis. 
Mcgloughlin denied Dalrymple Due Process at trial by coercing 
him into a Pro-Se defense after his attorney declaired Conflict of 
Interest,and not allowing any time to prepare. 
Mcgloughlin failed to mention D Angelo's conflict when D Angelo 
declared it,Thus depriving Dalrymple of a hearing on the matter. 
(Dalrymple surely would have asked for new counsel AGAIN and 
Mcgloughlin wanted to avoid that.) 
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Mcgloughlin made a mockery of Dalrymple's Right To Counsel 
by appointing D Angelo who had claimed Conflict as Standby eounsel. 
Mcgloughlin would later claim Dalrymple had the benifit of counsel 
throughout the trial. 
Dalrymple has been denied his right to face his accusers and 
present evidence in his defense. 
During Post-Conviction McGloughlin continues the Denial of 
Due-Process by ignoreing sworn testimony and then Condoning the 
shortcomings of both Schwartz and D Angelo. 
At both hearings Dalrymple has been Denied Due Process,and 
due to these denials and the Ineffective Assistance of Both of 
Dalrymple's counsels,There is a clear Indication that Dalrymple may 
be Innocent of the charges against him. 
Mr.Dalrymple's convictions should therefore be reversed in full 
The sentences Vacated and the case remanded. 
The New Encyclopedia of Stage Hypnotism 
The "Progressing to Sleep" Hypnotising Method 
Face committee and say:" All right, everyone, let's all try the experience 
of entering hypnosis together. You have co~e on stage for ~e purpose ?f 
b in hypnotised, so here is your opPorturuty to get hypnotised. You will 
e g · d' "d d tt · find it a very pleasant experience, so everyone give un tvi e a ention 
and concentrate. You will become hypnotised. 
"All ready. Relax in your chairs, place your feet flat on the floor and rest 
your hands in your lap. Now direct your eyes ~edly at r_ne and you will 
find your eyes quickly becoming heavy and tired. I ~11 count slowly 
from one to ten, and by the time I reach ten your eyes will be dosed and 
you will go to sleep, yet you will continue to hear me and will follow my 
suggestions at all times." 
Gesture towards the committee, while giving the suggestions. This 
appears dramatic to the audience ~s well as holding the attention o~ the 
subjects. Make sweeping passes with yo~ hands. Rereat the committee 
encompassing gestureS over and over until everyone s eyes are closed. ·, ., 
"Notice how pleasant and relaxed you begin to feel _throughout y · 
entire body. You will note a sensation of warmth gtoWlng all about 
and your eyes feel heavy and tired. All right, I :'ill count slowly · 
to ten now, and with every count your eyes will close more and 
by the time I reach the count of ten, or before, dose your eyes do . 
together and shut out the light. Ready. One ... two ... three .. 
eyes dosing all down tight .. . Five ... six .. . seven. Close your 
and let them rest. Eight .. . nine ... ten. Eyes all closed together_ 
out the light. Eyes all closed tight!" 1 
Glance over the entire committee; all subjects' eyes should 
Continue: '1t feels so good to close those tired eyes. So good, 
so tightly closed you cannot open them try as hard as you 
tightly they are shut together. See how they stick." 
In working with the entire committee as a unit, do not make 
this "eyelid fixation" but continue directly on: "Forget all 
eyes now and go to sleep. Go sound to sleep. You are 
down deeply to sleep. Sleep. Go sound to sleep. Your breaths 
ening as you drop down to sleep. Breathe deep and free, and . 
you take sends you down deeper and deep to sleep. You are · 
relaxed and your head falls forward on your chest and, as your .. . 
"rml the Pat Collins Show 
forward, you dr?p off into deep hypnotic sleep. [Head falls forward onto 
~est_ by all subJects; any who do not respond to this action are quietly 
dismissed. If someone in the audience has responded that m. 
. 't d ' perso~ 
uwi e to come on stage and fill the emptied chair.] You are in hypn<>gs 
and will follow instantly my every suggestion." o 
0 
NOTE TO HYPNOTIST: Observe how this induction oom~nds one series of 
sugges~s upon another: first, eye closure and dropping asleep; second, breath 
deepening, producing sleep; third, bodily relaxation and head falling forward on 
chest; ~urth, the suggestion that all suggestions will be responded to Immedi-
ately. This is a progressive-relaxation method of hypnotising that Pat Collins per-
forms rapidly, directly to the point. She wastes no time and her show is paced f 
action. or 
Pat Collins now goes to each hypnotised person in tum and lifts 
'ht . th. . anarm stra1g up l1l e all' with the command that it is stiff and rigid and th 
cannot move it; that they cannot lower it try as hard as they will. If aneY_ 
. one_ lo:W~rs the~ arm ~t pe~n is immediately dismissed. The empti:d 
charr is unmed1ately filled with another tesPonsive volunteer. All sub-
jects with the~ arms ?IP~ly upright and unable to move (Pat pulls on 
each to ascertam the ngidity) are retained. She then suggests: 
, persons with their arm upraised are in hypnosis, and at the count of 
' your arm will instantly fall relaxed to your side and when it hits 
side you will be in deep hypnosis. You will forget all your inhibi-
and just hav~ a good time. Just let yourself go! Be prepared. to have 
and easy swing time. You will instantly resPond to everything I tell 
" The count is made, and all arms drop on the moment. The show is 
to roll a la Pat Collins's fast-paced routining. 
- TO HYPNOTIST: Observe how the Pat Collins's handling "mentally sets" 
to . respond rapdly to her suggestions. Further, that suggestions 
,to hypnotised persons should be clear and direct. Right on target! Pat 
. ~ on the somnambulistic level of hypnosis, causing the subjects to 
. quickly. She expects such reactions, and obtains such accordingly. She 
to feature the reactions of one subject at a time. When wori<ing with a 
in Hmlted stage space, this wori<s splendidly. By way of example, she 
8 subject by name, as we'll now see. 
PRECISION THERA 
At the count of three ... double the feeling .. . 1 ... 2 ... 3 ... * 
As I count you down ... subcon will take you back to the very first 
time that feeling arose. 
Going back in time now ... (8) ... younger and younger ... (7) ... 
smaller and smaller ... back to being very, very small ... (6) the 
feeling is strong ... (5) ... (4) ... (3) ... (2) ... (1) .. . Zero ... There 
you are ... now go back to five minutes before the feeling arose and 
tell me - what's happening? Alone or with someone .. . etc., etc. 
Now - feel yourself getting smaller and smaller again, younger 
and younger - and rise up above your present body and go back 
along the time-line before your birth ... or to some time before the 
cause of your present symptoms ... sometime before the sensitising 
event or emotions occurred that sowed the seed for your present 
problem - to a time perhaps when you felt warm - comforted -
supported and sustained - you know there was such a time so - be 
there now .... when you're there, your head will nod. Good ... now 
- come forward in time to a few moments before the event or 
experience that created the sensitivity that is producing the unwel-
come symptom ... 
When you're there-your right index finger will rise ... and you'll 
be able to tell me about it. You're there now - just a few minutes 
before the causative event ... tell me ... where do you find yourself? 
Have you been born? Are you alone or with someone? ... Intensify 
the feeling ... clarify the picture at the count of three ... 1 ... 2 ... 3 
... ,. What's happening now? 
'Nothing'. 
What do you feel? 
'Nothing'. 
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IDAHO CODE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
~ 19-4902 Presentation of issue in prior prceedings, 
Ineffective assistance of prior post conviction counsel may provide 
sufficiant reason for permitting newly asserted allegationscor 
allegations inadequatly raised in the initial application to be 
raised in subsequent post-conviction application. 
Schwartz v. State,2008, 177 P.3d 400, 145 Idaho 
Relation-back doctrine 
When asecond or successive application is presented because 
because the initial application was summarily dismissed due to the 
alledged ineffectiveness of the initial post-conviction counsel, 
use of the relation-back doctrine may be appropriate, because 
failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful 
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative 
of due process. 
Schwartz v. State,2008 
Time for proceedings 
If an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has 
been concluded,an inmate may file a subsequent application outside 
of the one year limitation period if the court finds a ground for 
relief asserted which for sufficiant reason was not asserted or was 
inadequetly raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application. 
Schwartz v.State, 2008 
§ 19-4904 
Right to counsel 
Counsel should be appointed for petitioner seeking post-
conviction relief if the petitioner qualifies financially and 
alleges facts to raise the possibility of a valid claim. 
Hust v.State, 2009, 214 P.3d 668, 147 Idaho. 
pg.3 
§ 19-4904 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Necessity for free provision of counsel 
If an applicant seeking post-conviction relief alleges facts 
that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court 
should appoint counsel in order to give the applicant an opportunity 
to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting 
facts. 
Gonzalez v. State,2011,254 P.3d 69, 151 Idaho 
Adequacy of representation 
Although petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed 
in post-conviction proceedings in order to search the record for 
possible nonfrivoious claims, he should be provided with a mean-
ingful opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his request 
for court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of his petition 
where he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid claim. 
Plant v. State, 2006, 152 P.3d 629, 143 Idaho 
§ 19-4906 
Adequacy of counsel, grounds for relief 
A post-conviction proceeding is usually the only method to 
bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
State v. Yakovac, 2006, 2006 WL 3113540, Unreported 
pg.4 
REPLY TO INTENT TO DISMISS SUCCESIVE PETITION 
I'm not sure I understand completly Judge Moody's explanation 
why the court would dismiss my petition. On August l9,2013 I asked 
the court to appoint counsel. The main reason being to assist in 
the interpretation of court documents and trained expertise in 
properly presenting briefs and pleadings, including evidence, to 
the court. 
On August 30,2013 JUdge Moody denied the motion for council 
on the baises that the successive petition does not allege facts 
to raise even the possibility of a valid claim. 
I would ask you to reconsider. 
It is not my intent to present incomplete or inadequate petitions 
to the court. I am not trained in the law and have little or no 
expertise. As you can tell by my fileing. I thought however that 
an accusation substantiated with the record was and is fact. 
Specificaly ••• (1) Trial counsel failed to investigate. 
(2) Conflict of interest. (3) Dalrymple was constructivly denied 
counsel. (4) Cumulative errors. 
All of these allegations are are substantiated in the transcript 
included in my Augest 19, 2013 filing. If for some reason the 
transcripts failed to arrive on your desk I have once again included 
them with this reply. They are Supreme Court Docket No. 36973 ••• 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL. and •• Suppreme Court No. 31398 •• Case NO. 
H0301506 •• H0301629 •• APPEAL TRANSCRIPT ••• and Supreme Court No.31398 
Case No. H0301506 •• H0301629 ••• APPEAL TRANSCRIPT(SUPPLEMENTAL). 
DAngelo admits his investigation lacked substance. He didn't 
even try to interview Shelley or Kelsea. Which he testifies his 
client continually requested he do. He failed to subpoena physical 
evidence his client told him existed to substantiate his claims of 
hypnosis.And,He failed to secure an expert in hypnosis to interview 
his client or Kelsea. Which again,His client requested he should 
do if he intended to represent him properly. 
Dalrymple respectfully asks Judge Moody. 
Since DAngelo has admitted to these deficiencies in his 
performance. Doesn't that make them fact?~. And accordingly, 
prove his representation of Mr.Dalrymple. was ineffective? And, 
Demonstrate to the court that Dalrymple may have been convicted 
for acts he did not commit? 
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Judge Moody also asks why Dalrymple's other claims were not 
raised in his initial petition for Post Conviction relief? 
(1) The District Courts refusal to allow testimony from a key 
wittness (2)Involuntary choice to represent himself,and the courts 
coercion.(3) Denial of Constitutional Rights through the courts 
conduct & decisions. (4) Competency to stand trial.? 
The answer to Judge Moody's question in part is,I don't know. 
Cristopher Schwartz,who was the attorney handeling the initial 
Post-Conviction,informed me he would be happy to put Kelsea on the 
stand providing she would testify to the hypnosis. To my knowledge 
Mr.Schwartz never followed that thought up with an interview of 
Kelsea,and like Dangelo before him he failed to secure an expert 
in hypnosis,and failed to determine the existence of hypnotically 
implanted false memories. 
When I arrived at the hearing that evidence and wittness were 
once again,conspicuously absent. Mr.Schwartz did however explain 
that he believed the testimony fromKelsea ,or,expert testimony, 
would not be necessary because he believed Dangelo's admission 
of his poor handeling of the case along with the record would be 
enough to overturn the convictions. 
I cannot answer as to why Mr.schwartz chose to ignore every 
other issue in the record.But I'm confident that an attorneys fast 
& loose handeling of a case is somthing the court has seen before. 
As I read Judge Moody'sNotice Of Intent To Dismiss,on page 5 
she states Dalrymple has not demonstated or alledged any specific 
ground for relief raised in his initial Post-Conviction Petition. 
was inadequetly presented by counsel. 
I don't know what Judge Moody is looking for here. I don't 
understand what needs to be presented. I'm sure it exists I just 
don't know how to present adequetly to the court. 
I think,or thought, Ineffective assistance of counsel would 
be areasonable conclusion when all the issues are not presented. 
The record shows inadequetly raised issues by Schwartz.Evidence is 
not brought,or even investigated in order to substantiate the @!aims 
that were brought. I submitted the record of the initial Post -
Conviction hearing because Judge McLaughlin focusess on the 
deficiencies in Schwartz's presentation. The record is evidence 
of ineffective asisstance. What more do I need? 
pg.6 
To Judge Moody respectfully. 
Whatever I need to submit to the court to establish factual 
basis,other than the record,I would happily submit. Just tell me 
what it is. 
In her Motion To Summarily Dissmiss Jean Fisher first attempts 
to misslead the court by stateing there was ten counts of lewd 
conduct.She knows that's not true. She claims the evidence I 
wanted to present was undisclosed. She knows that Dangelo had been 
informed,and she came to trial armed with case law on hypnosis 
and used that case law to prevent Dalrymple's testimony about 
hypnosis. In fact Dalrymple asserted collusion between jean Fisher 
and Dangelo, and testified his grounds for makeing such an 
acusation was Jean Fisher's preparidness with case law readily 
available about hypnosis. 
Jean Fisher states Dalrymple testified as an"expert'! 
Thats not true. Dalrymple never testified as an "expert" nor did 
he attempt to. In fact, Dalrymple has consistetly maintained he 
was not an expert,and, That an expert was needed to evaluate his 
statements and interview Kelsea. 
I don't know why,but on page 2 Fisher focuses on a "release 
date". Or says things like,She would"wake"up from her hypnotized 
state. Here Fisher selects partial statements and uses them out of 
context. Another attempt to misslead. 
I did in fact try to instill in Kelsea's thinking a time period 
when she could inform her mother she was not molested.And Kelsea's 
not asleep. I have no communication with Shelley or Kelsea and I 
don't know how this suggestion played out. Jean Fisher attempts to 
misrepresent the facts to suit her agenda. 
Jean Fisher knows and recognizes the necessity of an expert 
in hypnosis to substantiate Dalrymple's claims. She also recognizes 
Dangelo's and Schwartz's failure to secure an expert,or even attempt 
to lay proper foundation. So I guess I don't understand her argument. 
An expert was requested by Dalrymple;before trial,after trial,and 
during trial.Dalrymple's counsel refused to investigate. That's all 
true. Why is she arguing? We're in agreement. Let's call an expert. 
pg.7 
I don't have access to a real law library. It's impossible 
for me to research and quote cases. Jean Fisher has me at a huge 
disadvantage in that regard. I do however have the facts to my 
advantage, Providing we move past the distortions of the 
prosecutor's office. 
While I don't have access to experts in hypnosis, once again 
I have the facts. I also have the next best thing to an expert. 
Which is experts through books. 
(Cristopher Schwartz questioned Dangelo about books on hypnosis, 
yet never presented them as evidence.) (Improper presentation.) 
During his testimony Dangelo focused on a countdown method! for 
induction into hypnosis. Dangelo testified Dalrymple had explained 
this method to him during an interview at the Ada County jail 
prior to trial. He also testified he spoke with a Dr. Beaver, and 
explained the method to him. Dangelo claims Dr.Beaver told him 
the method was not possible. 
I am submitting to the court excerpts from 
The Encyclopedia Of Stage Hypnotism, by Ormond McGill. 
Precision Therapy, by Duncan McColl. 
Scripts & Strategies in Hypnotherapy, by Roger P. Allen. 
Each Author presented is an Expert in thier area of practice. 
And while there are many methods of induction, the only ones I 
am presenting today make use of a countdown. 
The submission of these exibits is intended to add credibility 
to Dalrymple's statement of method,and,debunk the testimony of 
Dangelo. 
It is my hope these exibits will persuade the court to take 
a closer look. There was at the time of trial,physical evidence, 
in the form of journal & tapes & computer, which Dangelo & Schwartz 
refused to subpoena from Shelley. And of course the interview 
and testimony of Kelsea. 
I have not had communication with Shelley or Kelsea and will 
require the assistance of the court in gathering more evidence. 
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Due process issues improperly presented,or inadequetly raised 
in the original petition,justify the fileing of successive post-
conviction claims of Ineffective Assistance of counsel. 
As to the issue of Time-Barred. 
Jean Fisher once again attempts to misslead the court. While 
Ms.Fisher claims 4 years has passed since the original Post-conviction 
was dismissed,and she may be correct,She is not correct however in 
using that date to do her tolling. 
Idaho Code ss 19-4902 Requiers that Post-Conviction petitions 
be filed within one year from the experation of the time for appeal, 
or from the determination of an appeal, or fromthe determination 
of a proceeding following an appeal. 
The last fileing in this case is ••• 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Case No.12-35320 
Filed Sep.19,2012 
I will include a copy of the filed order. 
It is my understanding this is the Date when tolling for this 
fileing began. The fileing date for this current petition is 
August 19,2013. Dalrymple asks Judge Moody to finfl~,
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properly filed for time. Thank You. uJ/;J:' 
David Dalrymple. 
Petitioner. 
Case: 12-35320 09/19/2012 ID: 8330573 DktEntrJ: 4 Page: 1 of 1 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
DAVID ALLEN DALRYMPLE, No. 12-35320 
FILED 
SEP 19 2012 
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
Petitioner - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:10-cv-00494-CWD 




Respondent - Appellee. 
Before: LEA VY and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges. 
The request for a certificate of appealability is denied. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253( c )(2). All pending motions, if any, are denied as moot. 
